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It is important to develop not only the usefulness of
the two basic statements but also their limitations. One
of the most important limitations is in relation to study
of adequacy of working capital. Material contained in
balance sheets and income statements is not arranged
so as to facilitate its use for this purpose. In corporate
annual reports these statements are often supplemented
by a statement of flow of funds. Study of such state­
ments is desirable for a number of reasons including the
light thus thrown on the relation between periodic ac­
counting for depreciation (amortization of cost) and
the provision of funds for replacements.
Security prospectuses and annual reports to share­
holders are used as stimulating and realistic material for
presenting many of the topics covered. Students are in­
troduced to SEC Regulation S-X, the general regulation
governing statements filed with the Commission, and to
the accounting series of releases.
A number of important areas of accounting are left
untouched because they are better studied in the law
courses themselves. This is true of accounting for issu­
ance and reacquisition of shares, for dividend distribu­
tion, and for formal reduction of capital stock and so­
called "quasi-reorganization." The same is true of the
peculiarities of public utility accounting and of account­
ing in relation to segregating principal and income when
property is held in trust.
As already suggested, the lawyer requires a critical
approach to accounting concepts. As an illustration of
such an approach, the readings include an imaginative
and witty article by Walton Hamilton on the limits of
accounting concepts and techniques. To test student
understanding of the article, I like to raise the question
as to whether Hamilton's attitude is one of hostile de­
bunking. Last year a student immediately answered
that such a characterization would be quite unfair­
that Hamilton merely applies to accounting concepts
the approach familiar to our students from their study
of Dean Levi's Introduction to Legal Reasoning.
Experience has suggested that a few students have to
be warned against expecting too much from their knowl­
edge of accounting. They need to be reminded that legal
questions concerning income usually involve questions
of interpretation which accounting principles, however
well settled, do not foreclose. Thus if it should become
recognized that as a matter of accounting depreciation
expense should be increased to take account of infla­
tionary change in purchasing power, the resulting con­
cept of income would not necessarily be applicable under
an income bond indenture. To apply such a concept of
income would give shareholders a protection from the
impact of inflation at the expense of bondholders whose
maximum return is not adjusted in relation to decreased
purchasing power. In learning something of accounting
analysis, law students must remember to think like law­
yers.
Book Reviews-Home and Abroad
We bring to the attention of the alumni two recent re­
views of books published by members of The Law School
Faculty. The first, a review of Allison Dunham's Modern
Real Estate Transactions: Cases and Materials, appeared
in the October, 1952, issue of the American Bar Associa­
tion Journal. The second edition of Edward H. Levi's
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning was reviewed in the
April, 1952, edition of The Law Quarterly Review, pub­
lished in England. Both reviews follow in their entirety.
Modern Real Estate Transactions: Cases and Materials.
By ALLISON DUNHAM. Brooklyn: Foundation Press,
Inc., 1952! Pp. 1029. $8.50.
Concerning this book, the author, a professor of law
at the University of Chicago, says that its objective "is
to bring together for teaching purposes the legal con­
cepts and institutions of the marketing of land"; that
"it is organized on the basis of problems in house market­
ing." House-building problems are not dealt with. Start­
ing with the raw material, namely, the land on which
the housing structure is finally to stand, the problems of
processing the land for its intended use-zoning and
other restrictions imposed by public authority-are first
considered. Next come controls imposed by private agree­
ment-easements, equitable servitudes and covenants
running with the land. Here are considered problems
of basic policy as to what restrictions and covenants may
be enforced, such as restraints on alienation, racial re­
strictions.
Problems in house marketing
occupy some two-thirds of the
book. This is as it should be,
since few of the students who
use this book will ever represent
subdividers or wholesale build­
ers, but all of them will have to
do with problems affecting the
sale or leasing of housing struc­
tures. This practical approach is
typical. The student will find
nothing here about the the Stat- Allison Dun/lam
ute of Uses, or De Donis, or
Quia Emptores. He will find something about the
Statute of Frauds, for that is an element entering into
almost every transaction affecting real property.
In a review of reasonable length, it is possible only
to mention some of the house marketing problems dealt
with. They cover a field of an extent which will surprise
the lawyer who has dealt with such matters piecemeal
as they arise in practice. To enumerate a few: Who
participates in these transactions-buyer, seller, broker,
mortgagee, escrow agent, attorneys for any or all of these
-and the laws or customs affecting their participation;
documents and papers; when title passes; what consti­
tutes performance; remedies of the parties; title prob-
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lems and methods of title assurance. The concluding
chapter deals with transfers of undivided interests.
Throughout the work is valuable material on the
historical, economic and social aspects of house market­
ing and the preparation of land for residential purposes.
As the author is careful to point out in his preface, he
espouses no theory. He is a careful and industrious ex­
positor who has presented a well-organized work in
which is drawn together from varied sources, not all of
them by any means what we commonly term "legal,"
a vast collection of material dealing with an important
field of the law.
The author calls his work a "coursebook." The term
suggests casebook, plus something more, giving a promise
which the work fulfils. It is in fact a source book, and
it has characteristics which we commonly associate with
well-written textbooks. For that reason, I have no hesi­
tancy in recommending it to practitioners, as well as to
the students for whose needs it was evidently primarily
prepared. The opinions, about one hundred, which, scat­
tered throughout, are given in full, do not occupy a dis­
proportionate part of the 1029 pages. The number of addi­
tional cases cited or quoted from cannot be readily de­
termined, since not all of them are referred to in the
table of cases, but the number is large. A detailed table
of contents is supplemented by an index.
WALTER L. NossAMAN
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. By EDWARD H. LEVI.
Second Impression. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1950. Pp.
iv + 74. $2.00.
This book marks an important advance in "realist"
jurisprudence. Professor Levi holds with Jerome Frank
that it is mere "folklore" to regard law as "a system of
known rules applied by a judge" and legal reasoning as
consisting in the subsumption of a new case under a
given fixed rule. But for him this overthrow of our
traditional jurisprudence does not annihilate all j uris­
prudence; it does not reduce the legal process to mere
guesswork or a calculation of the psychological or diges­
tive factors operating within the individual judge. The
legal process is still a process of reasoning and legal con­
cepts and rules are still the tools with which it works.
Legal reasoning, however, "has a logic of its own." "The
kind of reasoning involved in the legal process is one
in which the classification changes as the classification is
made." Nevertheless this kind of reasoning can be an
object of study and, indeed, "the law forum is the most
explicit demonstration of the mechanism required for
a moving classification system."
Legal reasoning is reasoning by example or analogy.
Competing examples, for instance, previous decisions,
are presented to the court and the court chooses which
it will apply. Its choice is ultimately a reflection of the
ideas generally prevailing in the time and place to which
it belongs, but its decision is not necessarily expressed
directly in terms of these ideas. The legal process em­
ploys a mechanism of rules, concepts and classifications.
Each new decision by adding something reshapes the
rule, and the classifications thus change from case to
case. Yet in their changes a general law of growth and
decline can be traced. Professor Levi illustrates his mean­
ing by three brilliant historical studies of case-law, statu­
tory interpretation and constitutional interpretation. In
the first stage (we take only his account of case-law,
illustrated from the cases concerning dangerous chattels)
a succession of courts fumbles its way towards a classifica­
tory concept which will help in the practical task of deci­
sion. In the second stage, having found what seems a
practically useful concept, for instance, that of "inherent­
ly dangerous things," the courts proceed to apply it in
a line of cases, filling up its categories with particular in­
stances, until the dangerous list comprises "a loaded gun,
possibly a defective gun, mislabelled poison, defective
hairwash, scaffolds, a defective coffee urn and a defective
aerated bottle," while the nondangerous list includes "a
defective carriage, a bursting lamp, a defective balance
wheel for a circular saw and a defective boiler." Then
in the last stage of the process the courts, feeling (as in
the judgments in MacPherson v. Buick) that their
classification is getting out of touch with social life, or
rather that social life is getting out of touch with their
classification, begin to cast about for a higher or wider
principle or rule, and, as they do so, the concept which
hitherto has served them gradually falls into disuse. But
a broad formulation of the new principle (such as was
attempted by Brett M.R. in Heaven v. Pender) is of
no use for direct application. The new principle neces­
sarily embodies its own concepts and thus involves the
need for further classification. The decision in Donoghue
v. Stevenson, for instance, contained many possibilities
of future distinctions-distinctions as to degree of prox­
imity or degree of control, distinctions between articles
for internal consumption and articles for external use,
between obvious and latent dangers, between personal
inj ury and mere pecuniary loss, and so on. All these lines
of thought may on occasion have to be explored by the
courts until new bases for classification are settled. And
so .he process goes on. One can think of other topics of
case-law, for instance, the history of restraints on trade
or the cases following upon Rylands v. Fletcher, to which
Professor Levi's analysis would seem equally apt. It cer­
tainly deserves extensive and thorough testing, for, if
sound, it opens the way to a new understanding of the
common law and its method.
Professor Levi's illustrations of the judicial process
applied to statutory interpretation (the Mann Act) and
constitutional interpretation (the "commerce clause") are
equally brilliant and suggestive. Here too the process is
in broad lines the same, but with differences. For in­
stance, a judge is not so free in dealing with a statute
or even with interpretative precedent as he is with pre-
(Continued on page 10)
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Federal Tax Conference
We failed, in the Autumn Quarter issue of THE RECORD,
to report on the fifth annual Federal Tax Conference held
in October under the auspi.ces of The Law School, the
School of Business, and University College. Alumni
readers of Taxes magazine will have seen the December
The Fifth Federal Tax Conference in session
issue which reported the proceedings and printed a num­
ber of the papers given at the conference. But we want to
tell the alumni generally about this fifth and largest (thus
far) conference on federal taxation.
The topics ranged from "Shifting Income within the
Family Group" to "Practical Legal Aspects of Tax Ac­
counting," and fifteen different subjects filled the three
days of meetings. The Planning Committee under the
chairmanship of Robert R. Jorgensen of Sears, Roebuck
and Company included The Law School's Walter J.
Blum, William M. Emery of McDermott, Will and
Emery, William N. Hahhad of Bell, Boyd, Marshall and
Lloyd, James D. Head of Winston, Strawn, Black and
Towner, William A. McSwain of Eckhart, Klein, Mc-
Left to right: Walter [, Blum, Robert N. Miller, and
Randolph Paul, with participants at the Fifth Annual
Federal Tax Conference.
Swain and Campbell, Michael J. Sporer of Arthur Ander­
sen and Company, Harry B. Sutter of Hopkins, Sutter,
Halls, DeWolfe and Owen, and the School of Business'
Royal S. Van de Woestyne.
Highlights of the Conference were Randolph Paul's
discussion of "Directions in Which Tax Policy and Law
Have Been Moving," an appraisal of "The Reorganiza­
tion of the Bureau of Internal Revenue" by Robert N.
Miller, and Leo A. Diamond's analysis of "Gifts to
Minors."
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cedents in the realm of case-law, because all the words
of a statute are operative and none can be treated as mere
dictum; nevertheless they nearly always admit differ­
ences of interpretation. A written Constitution such as
that of the United States, however, increases the freedom
of the courts in as much as it opens the possibility of
appealing from precedent or statute to the higher law
of the Constitution, and a written Constitution, express­
ing in broad language the ideals of its age, "must be
enormously ambiguous in its general provisions."
Such in the author's view is the true nature of legal
reasoning and such are the lines on which it should be
studied. Obviously its results in any single case must be
uncertain and hard to predict; we may have been rescued
from the utter confusion into which other realists seemed
to have plunged us but we have no hope of regaining
our old comfortable faith in law as an exact science
satisfying the ordinary man's desire for certainty in the
conduct of his affairs. Why then do we accept the law
and bow to its compulsion? Professor Levi does not
leave this question unanswered. In the first place, even
if we cannot predict the choice which a court will in a
particular case make between competing analogies, legal
procedure "protects the parties and the community by
making sure that the competing analogies are before
the court ... in this sense the parties as well as the court
participate in the law making. In this sense, also, lawyers
represent more than the litigants." In the second place,
much of the law is at any moment reasonably certain. It
is only the area of doubt that calls for the intervention
of the court and "the area of doubt is constantly set
forth. The probable area of expansion or contraction is
foreshadowed as the system works. This is the only kind
of system which will work when people do not agree
completely."
The publishers are not wrong when they say in their
note that "this volume will be of interest and value to
students of logic, ethics and political philosophy, as well
as to members of the legal profession and to everyone
concerned with problems of government and j urispru­
dence." Few volumes of such small bulk contain so much
matter for thought.
A. H. CAMPBELL
